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Abstract 
During dialogue, references are presented, accepted and potentially reused (depending on 
their accessibility in memory). Two experiments were conducted to examine reuse in a 
naturalistic setting (a walk in a familiar environment). In Experiment 1, where the participants 
interacted face-to-face, self-presented references and references accepted through verbatim 
repetition were reused more. Such biases persisted after the end of the interaction. In 
Experiment 2, where the participants interacted over the phone, reference reuse mainly 
depended on whether the participant could see the landmarks being referred to, although this 
bias seemed to be only transient. In line with the memory-based approach to dialogue, these 
results shed light on how differences in accessibility in memory (due to how these references 
were initially added to the common ground or the media used) affect the unfolding of the 
interaction. 
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Generating references in naturalistic face-to-face and phone-mediated dialogue settings 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During dialogue, speakers interact in order to reach a common goal such as discussing a route, 
for instance. According to the collaborative approach to dialogue, speakers make individual 
efforts during the interaction to ensure mutual comprehension (e.g., Clark, 1996). One way of 
doing so consists in tailoring the content of one’s utterances to the current addressee, for 
instance by favoring the production of references which are easily understandable to him or 
her (Isaacs & Clark, 1987). Partner-adapted reference production requires speakers to estimate 
their partner’s level of knowledge. Such estimations are based on the partners’ common 
ground, which includes the knowledge that two speakers are aware of sharing (Clark & 
Marshall, 1981). 
 In particular, the common ground includes the references produced by the speakers 
during past interactions. References are added to the common ground through a joint 
contribution process (Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) consisting in a 
presentation phase, during which one of the speakers produces a reference, followed by an 
acceptance phase, during which the other speaker manifests his or her understanding of the 
reference presented. Acceptance is either explicit (e.g., verbatim repetition of the reference) or 
implicit (e.g., initiation of the next relevant speech turn) (Clark & Brennan, 1991). References 
are also accepted through non-linguistic cues (e.g., head nods; Clark & Krych, 2004).  
 Presented and accepted references are then potentially reused during the remainder of 
the interaction. Reuse depends on reference accessibility in memory from each speaker’s 
point of view, with readily accessible references being more likely to be reused (Knutsen & 
Le Bigot, 2012). In particular, reference accessibility depends on reference production at the 
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time of presentation and/or acceptance. Self-presented references are more likely to be reused 
than partner-presented ones, and references accepted through verbatim repetition are more 
likely to be reused than references accepted implicitly (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014). However, 
the influence of presentation on reference accessibility seems to be only transient, as reference 
accessibility after the end of an interaction is no longer significantly affected by initial 
presentation. Rather, it depends on acceptance, but also on how many times a given reference 
was reused during the interaction, suggesting that the level of accessibility of the references 
which belong to the common ground changes during the interaction (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 
2015). This pattern of results has been attributed to a production effect in memory whereby 
words produced aloud are remembered better than words read silently (MacLeod, Gopie, 
Hourihan, Neary, & Ozubko, 2010). This effect is reinforced when these words are self-
produced rather than partner-produced (MacLeod, 2011). Hence, studies on dialogic reuse 
illustrate the idea that “ordinary” memory mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms which are not 
specific to dialogue) play a central role in dialogue; in this sense, these studies are in line with 
the memory-based approach to dialogue developed by Horton and colleagues (Horton, 2007; 
Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 2005a, 2005b).  
 Of central interest for the current study, there has recently been an effort to take 
dialogue studies outside the laboratory. For instance, Brennan, Schuhmann, and Batres (2013) 
have made available the Walking Around Corpus, which consists in the transcription of 
spontaneous dialogues produced by dyads of participants interacting over the phone. One of 
the participants (the Giver) gave instructions to the other participant (the Follower) to enable 
the latter to find various locations on a University campus. Analyzing this corpus revealed – 
among other results – that the time taken to complete the task was related to the Giver’s 
mental rotation ability. Another example is offered by Bangerter and Mayor (2013), who 
reported an experiment during which a Narrator told a story to another participant. The 
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partners performed the task either without moving or walking along a more or less complex 
route. The results illustrate how dialogue partners jointly manage the constraints associated 
with two concurrent activities (i.e., interacting and navigating a spatial environment). Such 
studies have important theoretical implications. They illustrate how the constraints inherent to 
real-life interactions, which are not always represented in laboratory settings, interact with the 
psychological processes involved in dialogue.  
 The current study is part of this ongoing effort to take dialogue studies outside the 
laboratory. It seeks to examine reference reuse in a more naturalistic dialogue situation in 
order to determine how the features of this situation affect dialogue management. In 
particular, in naturalistic settings, the participants must decide how to refer to the referents 
deemed relevant to the task; in other words, they must generate these references. This is not 
necessarily the case in laboratory settings, where the references which should be used by the 
participants are usually predefined in advance by the experimenters. Therefore, in naturalistic 
dialogue settings, self-presented words benefit both from a production effect and a generation 
effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978), which might cause the self-presentation benefit to decay 
slower than in laboratory settings. 
 Moreover, so far reference reuse has exclusively been investigated in face-to-face 
dialogue, raising the question of the generalizability of the findings to mediated dialogue. 
Media constrain dialogue in several different ways. For instance, dialogue partners gesture 
differently depending on whether they are interacting face-to-face or over the phone (Bavelas, 
Gerwing, Sutton, & Prevost, 2008). Access to visual copresence (e.g., through 
videoconferencing) also affects the partners’ ability to jointly perform a complex task such as 
repairing a bike (Kraut, Fussell, & Siegel, 2003). Finally, media constrain the way in which 
speakers add information to their common ground, as all of the strategies used by the speakers 
in face-to-face dialogue are not necessarily available in mediated dialogue (Clark & Brennan, 
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1991). For instance, when speakers interact over the phone, they cannot manifest their 
understanding by using head nods, which makes them more likely to use linguistic 
acceptance. Media might also affect reference reuse. For instance, when A and B interact over 
the phone, they might refer to referents which are only visible to A. Because reuse also 
depends on referent visibility (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012), this would make A more likely to 
reuse the corresponding references than B. The second purpose of this study is to address this 
possibility. 
 In two experiments, dyads of participants interacted to establish a route for foreign 
students visiting their University campus. In Experiment 1, the participants followed the route 
as they discussed it, referring to the landmarks they encountered. The purpose of this 
experiment was to determine whether reference reuse also depends on presentation and 
acceptance in naturalistic face-to-face dialogue. The first hypothesis was that self-presented 
references are more likely to be reused than partner-presented ones. The second hypothesis 
was that references accepted through verbatim repetition are more likely to be reused than 
references accepted implicitly. The reuse of references accepted anaphorically was also 
examined to determine whether the acceptance effect is due to verbatim repetition in 
particular or to repetition in general.  
 In Experiment 2, only one of the participants (the on-campus participant) followed the 
route during the interaction; the other participant (the remote participant) stayed at the 
laboratory. Thus, the landmarks mentioned were only visible to the former. The participants 
interacted over the phone. The purpose of this experiment was to determine whether reference 
reuse depends on the communication medium used. The first two hypotheses were the same 
as in Experiment 1. The third hypothesis was that on-campus participants are more likely to 
reuse references than remote participants.  
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 In both experiments, the participants’ memory for the route discussed was then 
assessed in an individual recall test to determine whether these differences in accessibility 
persist after the end of the interaction. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Twenty-six participants (8 male; mean age 21.73, SD = 4.75) divided into dyads volunteered 
to take part in the experiment. They had been living in the University town the experiment 
took place in for 2.38 years (SD = 1.58) on average prior to the experiment. They all signed 
an informed consent form before the beginning of the experiment and were fully debriefed 
about the purpose of the study after the end of the experiment. 
 
2.2. Apparatus 
 
A microphone connected to a digital recorder was used to record the participants.  
 
2.3. Task and procedure 
 
The participants’ task was to organize a visit of their University campus for foreign students 
who had never visited it before. The visit ran from an amphitheater to a dining hall, with an 
intermediate stop in front of the library. The participants were free to choose whichever 
itinerary they liked between these points. They were told that they should discuss the route as 
they followed it to make sure that they agreed on it. 
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 The experiment was divided in two phases. During the first phase (dialogue phase), 
the participants were accompanied by the experimenter to the starting point of the visit. There, 
they were informed that they had as much time as necessary to set up a route as they followed 
it themselves. The experimenter stayed with the participants during the entire dialogue phase. 
The participants then walked back to the laboratory. During the second phase (recall phase), 
each participant had a maximum of 10 minutes to individually write the route out. No 
communication was allowed during this phase. 
 
2.4. Experimental design 
 
There were three independent variables (IVs): Presentation (a reference had either been self- 
or partner-presented), Acceptance (a reference had either been accepted through verbatim 
repetition, anaphorically or implicitly) and the Number of Reuses in the Dyad (which was a 
centered continuous IV).  
  
2.5. Data coding 
 
The landmarks mentioned by at least one of the dyads during the experiment (79 in total; 
some were mentioned by all dyads, some were mentioned by some of the dyads only and 
others were only mentioned by one of the dyads) were listed and coded for Presentation, 
Acceptance, Reuse and Recall (Tables 1 & 2). Only buildings and streets were counted as 
landmarks. References to other locations (e.g., “Room 4”) were not counted as landmarks. 
Participants tended to use these references several times to refer to different locations (e.g., 
the reference “Room 4” was used to refer to Room 4 in the psychology building and Room 4 
in the literature building) and it was not always possible to determine from the context which 
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location was referred to. Thus, discarding these references from the analysis allowed 
minimizing the number of potential coding mistakes.  
 
------------------------Insert Table 1 about here------------------------ 
 
------------------------Insert Table 2 about here------------------------ 
 
 
2.5.1. Presentation, acceptance and reuse during the dialogue phase 
When a reference was produced for the first time, its initiator was identified to determine 
whether it was self-presented or partner-presented from each participant’s point of view. For 
instance, in Table 1, the reference “the psychology building” is coded as self-presented from 
B’s point of view and as partner-presented from A’s point of view.  
 After its presentation by one of the participants, each reference was then accepted by 
the other participant. The evidence produced by the latter between the moment when the 
reference was presented and the moment when its initiator produced another reference was 
examined to determine whether it was accepted through verbatim repetition (in which case it 
was repeated verbatim, as for “the psychology building”) or anaphorically (in which case the 
referent was re-referred to by using a pronoun or a zero anaphor, as for “the student house”). 
All other presented references were coded as accepted implicitly (as for “the literature 
building”). Note that contrary to Presentation, Acceptance was coded at the dyadic level. For 
instance, the reference “the literature building” is coded as accepted implicitly from both 
participants’ point of view. 
 All other occurrences of reference production were coded as reuses. In line with 
Knutsen and Le Bigot (2012, 2014, 2015), the only criterion was that reuse had to occur in a 
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speech turn preceded by two speech turns in which the reference had not been produced. 
Reuse was coded at two different levels. It was first coded as a binary variable from each 
participant’s point of view (the participant either reused the reference or not, regardless of 
how many times he or she reused it). For instance, the reference “the psychology building” is 
coded as non-reused from A’s point of view and as reused from B’s point of view. This 
coding served as the binary dependent variable in the Reuse analysis. Reuse was then coded 
as a continuous variable at the dyadic level. This coding reflected how many times each 
reference was reused by the dyad. For instance, the reference “the psychology building” is 
only reused once: it is thus coded as having been reused once by the dyad from both 
participants’ point of view. This coding served as a continuous IV in the Recall analysis. 
  
2.5.2. Recall during the recall phase 
The routes written out during the drafting phase were coded for recall. This was a binary 
variable: from each participant’s point of view, a reference was either recalled or non-
recalled. For instance, the reference “the student house” is coded as recalled from A’s point of 
view and as non-recalled from B’s point of view.  
 
2.6. Results 
 
The average number of words produced per dyad during the dialogue phase was 1858.08 (SD 
= 861.66), and the average number of references presented per dyad was 22.77 (SD = 6.56). A 
total of 296 references were presented. Among these, 87 (29.39%) were accepted through 
verbatim repetition, 98 (33.11%) were accepted anaphorically and 111 (37.50%) were 
accepted implicitly. The average number of words produced per participant during the recall 
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phase was 203.73 (SD = 50.88), and the average number of references recalled per participant 
was 10.69 (SD = 2.84).  
 The data were analyzed using logistic mixed models to account for the nesting of 
participants in dyads (McMahon, Pouget, & Tortu, 2006). The procedure followed to specify 
the random effects structures in these analyses is presented in Appendix A. For each dyad, 
only the data corresponding to the references which had been presented during the dialogue 
phase were analyzed, implying that the number of observations varied across dyads. This was 
accounted for in the analyses by applying the Satterthwaite correction (Keselman, Algina, 
Kowalchuk, & Wolfinger, 1999). The same analyses were conducted using the Kenward-
Roger correction: because the pattern of results obtained was identical to that obtained by 
applying the Satterthwaite correction, only the latter is reported. Main effects were 
systematically included in the models; interactions were only included when they reached 
significance. 
 
2.6.1. Reference reuse (dialogue phase) 
A total of 183 references were reused (i.e., the total number of “reused” in the Reuse column 
was 183) (Table 3). We first examined the odd ratios (OR) associated with the differences 
between the modalities of each independent variable to determine the direction of these 
differences. Self-presented references were more likely to be reused than partner-presented 
ones, OR = 1.78, CI.95 = 1.11, 2.86. References accepted through verbatim repetition or 
anaphorically were more likely to be reused than those accepted implicitly, respectively OR = 
2.02, CI.95 = 1.27, 3.20 and OR = 1.84, CI.95 = 1.17, 2.89. 
 
------------------------Insert Table 3 about here------------------------ 
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 A model was implemented including Presentation and Acceptance as fixed effects and 
Reuse as the binary outcome variable. The random structure included by-participant random 
slopes corresponding to Presentation. As expected, Presentation predicted Reuse, F(1, 49) = 
6.06, p = .017. Acceptance also predicted Reuse, F(2, 588) = 5.29, p = .005. References 
accepted through verbatim repetition or anaphorically were more likely to be reused than 
references accepted implicitly. An additional pairwise comparison revealed no significant 
difference between references accepted through verbatim repetition and anaphorically, p > .05 
(Sequential Bonferroni). The model parameters are reported in Appendix B (Table B1). 
 
2.6.2. Reference recall (recall phase) 
A total of 278 references were recalled (Table 4). Self-presented references were more likely 
to be recalled than partner-presented ones, OR = 1.49, CI.95 = 1.02, 2.18. References accepted 
through verbatim repetition or anaphorically were more likely to be recalled than references 
accepted implicitly, respectively OR = 2.89, CI.95 = 1.80, 4.64 and OR = 1.22, CI.95 = 0.77, 
1.94. Finally, the odds of recalling a reference increased with the number of reuses, OR = 
4.00, CI.95 = 2.65, 6.02. 
 
------------------------Insert Table 4 about here------------------------ 
 
 A model was implemented including Presentation, Acceptance and the Number of 
Reuses in the Dyad as fixed effects and Recall as the outcome variable. The random structure 
included by-dyad random intercepts and slopes corresponding to the Number of Reuses in the 
Dyad. Presentation predicted Recall, F(1, 587) = 4.37, p = .037. Acceptance also predicted 
Recall, F(2, 587) = 10.56, p < .001. References accepted through verbatim repetition were 
more likely to be recalled than references accepted implicitly. An additional pairwise 
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comparison revealed that references accepted through verbatim repetition were recalled more 
often than references accepted anaphorically, p = .002 (Sequential Bonferroni). Finally, the 
Number of Reuses in the Dyad predicted Recall, F(1, 12) = 54.63, p < .001. The model 
parameters are reported in Appendix B (Table B2).  
 
2.7. Discussion 
 
Experiment 1 sought to examine reference reuse outside the laboratory. As expected, self-
presented references were reused more often than partner-presented ones, and references 
accepted through verbatim repetition were reused more often than references accepted 
implicitly. These results replicate and extend those initially obtained by Knutsen and Le Bigot 
(2014) in a laboratory setting by showing how production and/or generation at the time of 
presentation and acceptance affect subsequent reuse. 
 Furthermore, reference accessibility at the end of the interaction depended on 
presentation, acceptance and reuse. The significant difference between self- and partner-
presented references confirmed that the presentation effect is increased in naturalistic settings, 
possibly due to generation. As for acceptance and reuse, the results follow the same pattern as 
in Knutsen and Le Bigot (2014). First, the differences in accessibility due to acceptance are 
observed after the end of the interaction. Second, the results confirm that reference 
accessibility in the common ground depends on reference production during the interaction, as 
recall also depended on how many times a reference was reused. 
 The reuse and recall of references accepted anaphorically were analyzed to determine 
whether the greater accessibility in memory of references accepted through repetition is due to 
repetition in general or to verbatim repetition in particular. The recall data suggest that this 
effect is due to verbatim repetition in particular, as references accepted through verbatim 
Naturalistic reference generation 
14 
repetition were recalled better than references accepted anaphorically. However, the 
difference between these two kinds of references was not significant in the reuse analysis, 
which revealed that both references accepted through verbatim repetition and anaphorically 
were more likely to be reused than those accepted implicitly. This is a priori incompatible 
with the suggestion that references accepted through verbatim repetition are more readily 
accessible than references accepted anaphorically, as reference accessibility in memory guides 
reference reuse (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012). One possible explanation is that the effect of 
acceptance on reuse reflects not only greater accessibility in memory of references accepted 
through verbatim repetition, but also strategic reasoning as to which references one’s partner 
is capable of understanding. Indeed, references accepted through verbatim repetition or 
anaphorically might be perceived by speakers as more easy to understand than references 
accepted implicitly, as the former are explicitly marked as mutually known. If this assumption 
is correct, during the interaction, references accepted anaphorically are reused because the 
speakers assume that their partner is capable of understanding them. References accepted 
through verbatim repetition are reused for the same reason, and also because they are more 
readily accessible due to a production effect. During the recall test, the participants’ 
performance is essentially driven by reference accessibility in memory, thus causing 
references accepted through verbatim repetition to be recalled better than any other kind of 
reference, including references accepted anaphorically. In sum, then, the effect of acceptance 
on reuse seems to be guided by accessibility in memory and strategic reasoning, and concerns 
all references accepted through repetition; by contrast, the effect of acceptance on recall 
seems to be guided mainly by accessibility in memory, and mainly concerns references 
accepted through verbatim repetition. 
 Importantly, examining reference recall is informative not only regarding the 
persistence of the accessibility differences observed during the interaction, but also regarding 
Naturalistic reference generation 
15 
the content of the trace left by the interaction in each speaker’s memory. This point is 
important, as such traces are resorted to by the speakers in subsequent interactions to 
determine which references belong to their common ground (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark & 
Marshall, 1981). The results suggest that the content of such traces depends on how a 
reference was grounded and on whether it was reused, implying that some references should 
be easier to subsequently access than others (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2015). Furthermore, A’s 
self-presented references correspond to B’s partner-presented references (and vice-versa), 
suggesting that the representations that A and B hold of their common ground are not 
necessarily identical. 
 To recap, naturalistic reference reuse depends on generation and/or production at the 
time of presentation and acceptance; the corresponding accessibility differences persist until 
after the end of the interaction. The purpose of Experiment 2 is to extend these findings by 
examining reference reuse in phone-mediated dialogue, as using a non-face-to-face medium 
might constrain reference reuse through referent visibility. In Experiment 2, the landmarks 
referred to during the dialogue phase were visible to one of the participants only. This should 
cause this participant to reuse more references than his or her partner (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 
2012). 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
3.1. Participants 
 
Twenty-eight participants (6 male, mean age 21.86, SD = 2.95) who had been living in the 
University town the experiment took place in for 3.09 years (SD = 2.19) on average prior to 
the experiment were recruited under the same conditions as in Experiment 1.  
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3.2. Apparatus 
 
A mobile phone and a land phone were used by the participants to communicate during the 
experiment. The dialogues were recorded using a digital recorder connected to the land phone. 
 
3.3. Task and procedure 
 
The task was similar to Experiment 1, except that the route was discussed over the phone. At 
the beginning of the experiment, each participant was assigned a role at random. The on-
campus participant was informed that he or she would follow the route while interacting over 
the phone with the remote participant, who would stay at the laboratory. An experimenter 
then accompanied the on-campus participant to the starting point of the visit while the remote 
participant stayed at the laboratory with another experimenter. At the end of the dialogue 
phase, the on-campus participant walked back to the laboratory, where both participants 
individually wrote the route out. 
 
3.4. Experimental design and data coding 
 
The experimental design was similar to that of Experiment 1, except that it included an 
additional IV, Partner Role (on-campus participant vs. remote participant). The data were 
coded in the same way as in Experiment 1.  
 
3.5. Results 
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The average number of words produced per dyad during the dialogue phase was 1767.86 (SD 
= 789.54), and the average number of references presented per dyad was 18.57 (SD = 3.34). A 
total of 260 references were presented. Among these, 47 (18.08%) were accepted through 
verbatim repetition, 158 (60.77%) were accepted anaphorically and 55 (21.15%) were 
accepted implicitly. The average number of words produced per participant during the recall 
phase was 192.32 (SD = 40.63), and the average number of references recalled per participant 
was 11.11 (SD = 2.56). The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1.  
 
3.5.1. Reference reuse (dialogue phase) 
A total of 230 references were reused (Table 5). On-campus participants were more likely to 
reuse references than remote participants, OR = 2.43, CI.95 = 1.11, 5.31. Self-presented 
references were slightly more likely to be reused than partner-presented ones, OR = 1.07, CI.95 
= 0.63, 1.82. Finally, references accepted through verbatim repetition or anaphorically were 
more likely to be reused than references accepted implicitly, respectively OR = 2.47, CI.95 = 
1.31, 4.67 and OR = 1.74, CI.95 = 1.03, 2.93. 
 
------------------------Insert Table 5 about here------------------------ 
 
 A model was implemented including Presentation, Acceptance and Partner Role as 
fixed effects and Reuse as the outcome variable. The random structure included by-dyad 
random intercepts and slopes corresponding to Partner Role and by-participant random 
intercepts and slopes corresponding to Partner Role and Presentation. Acceptance predicted 
Reuse, F(2, 515) = 4.04, p = .018. References accepted through verbatim repetition or 
anaphorically were more likely to be reused than references accepted implicitly. An additional 
pairwise comparison revealed no significant difference between references accepted through 
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verbatim repetition and references accepted anaphorically, p > .05 (Sequential Bonferroni). 
Partner Role also predicted reuse, F(1, 15) = 5.85, p = .029. In contrast, the effect of 
Presentation failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 25) = 0.07, p = .790. The model 
parameters are reported in Appendix B (Table B3).  
 
3.5.2. Reference recall (recall phase) 
A total of 311 references were recalled (Table 6). Contrary to what was found previously, on-
campus participants were less likely to recall references than remote participants, OR = 0.69, 
CI.95 = 0.42, 1.15. Self-presented references were more likely to be recalled than partner-
presented ones, OR = 1.28, CI.95 = 0.78, 2.10. Once again contrary to what was found 
previously, references accepted through verbatim repetition or anaphorically were less likely 
to be recalled than references accepted implicitly, respectively OR = 0.90, CI.95 = 0.27, 3.02 
and OR = 0.61, CI.95 = 0.20, 1.90. Finally, the odds of recalling a reference increased with the 
number of reuses, OR = 20.29.  
 
------------------------Insert Table 6 about here------------------------ 
 
 A model was implemented including Partner Role, Presentation, Acceptance, the 
Number of Reuses in the Dyad and the interaction between the Number of Reuses in the Dyad 
and Acceptance as fixed effects and Recall as the outcome variable. The random structure 
included by-dyad intercepts and slopes corresponding to Acceptance and the Number of 
Reuses and by-participant slopes corresponding to the Number of Reuses. The Number of 
Reuses in the Dyad predicted Recall, F(1, 32) = 30.08, p < .001. This main effect was 
modulated by a significant interaction with Acceptance, F(2, 367) = 4.76, p = .009. This 
interaction revealed that the odds of recalling a reference tended to increase with the number 
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of reuses in the dyad but that this tendency was weaker when this reference had been accepted 
through verbatim repetition than when it had been accepted implicitly. The effects of 
Presentation, Acceptance and Partner Role failed to reach statistical significance, respectively 
F(1, 512) = 0.93, p = .335, F(2, 32) = 0.68, p = .516 and F(1, 269) = 2.01, p = .157. The 
model parameters are reported in Appendix B (Table B4).  
 
3.6. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 sought to replicate Experiment 1 in a phone-mediated dialogue setting. 
Consistent with the finding that referent visibility guides reuse (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2012), 
on-campus participants reused more references than remote participants. Thus, 
communication media affect not only the way in which speakers add information to their 
common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991), but also the use that the speakers make of this 
common ground in the remainder of the interaction, for instance because the absence of visual 
copresence causes references to landmarks to be more readily accessible to one of the partners 
than to the other. Furthermore, contrary to Experiment 1, the effect of presentation on reuse 
failed to reach statistical significance in Experiment 2, suggesting that the speakers’ tendency 
to reuse self-presented references more often is attenuated when two speakers interact over 
the phone. One possible explanation is that the visibility effect is much stronger than the 
presentation effect, thus causing the latter to become non-significant statistically.  
 As in Experiment 1, reuse also depended on acceptance: references accepted through 
verbatim repetition were reused more often than references accepted implicitly. The effect of 
acceptance on reuse remained significant even when Partner Role was included in the model, 
suggesting that this effect was stronger than the presentation effect. This is consistent with the 
idea (developed above) that this effect is due to both greater accessibly in memory of 
Naturalistic reference generation 
20 
references accepted through verbatim repetition and strategic reasoning as to which references 
one’s partner is capable of understanding, whereas the effect of presentation is mainly due to 
greater accessibility in memory of self-presented references. 
 In Experiment 2, reference recall mainly depended on how many times the references 
had been reused during the interaction. A significant interaction with acceptance suggested 
that in phone-mediated settings, the references which do not benefit from an accessibility 
increase due to verbatim repetition at the time of acceptance are all the more likely to benefit 
from an accessibility increase due to reference reuse during the interaction. A plausible 
explanation is that in such settings, the accessibility increase due to acceptance through 
verbatim repetition causes a ceiling effect which limits the extent of which reference 
accessibility can subsequently be increased through reuse. Besides, the influence of Partner 
Role on reference recall failed to reach statistical significance, suggesting that the influence of 
landmark visibility was fairly low at the end of the interaction. Reference reuse during the 
interaction might have contributed to increase reference accessibility in memory from the 
remote participant’s point of view, thus making the references mentioned during the 
interaction similarly accessible from this participant’s and the on-campus participant’s point 
of view.  
 
4. General discussion 
 
The current study falls in a theoretical framework whose purpose is to account for the 
interaction between ordinary memory processes and common ground use in dialogue (e.g., 
Horton & Gerrig, 2005a). The aim of this study was to offer a better understanding of how 
differences in accessibility between the references which belong to the speakers’ common 
ground influence their reuse in a non-laboratory setting. 
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 The results obtained confirm that in naturalistic dialogue settings, the differences in 
accessibility due to the joint nature of grounding (i.e., presentation and acceptance) affect 
reuse in the remainder of the interaction. Reuse is also guided by referent visibility, which has 
important implications for mediated communication. Part of these memory biases persist after 
the end of the interaction. In line with the memory-based approach to dialogue (e.g., Horton & 
Gerrig, 2005a), these findings illustrate how ordinary memory mechanisms such as the 
production effect and/or the generation effect affect dialogue.  
These experiments also shed light on the benefits associated with taking dialogue 
studies outside the laboratory in at least two different ways. First, the fact that the presentation 
effect persisted after the end of the interaction in Experiment 1, whereas this was not the case 
in a laboratory setting (Knutsen & Le Bigot, 2014), suggests that more naturalistic 
experimental settings allow detecting effects which cannot necessarily be detected in the 
laboratory. Second, the fact that this study involved both face-to-face and mediated 
communication contributes to generalizing the results obtained to various kinds of naturalistic 
situations. It is important to point out here that mediated dialogue settings different from the 
one used in this experiment might give rise to different reuse patterns. For instance, part of the 
referents mentioned during an interaction between A and B might be visible only to A while 
others might be visible only to B, thus causing speakers to preferentially reuse different 
subsets of the references presented. 
 The current study was introduced within the framework of the memory-based 
approach to dialogue (e.g., Horton & Gerrig, 2005a), as its initial goal was to show how 
ordinary memory mechanisms might influence dialogue management. However, the results 
obtained are also compatible with other theoretical frameworks. Among these, the interactive 
alignment model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006; see also Garrod & Pickering, 2004, 2009) 
suggests that dialogue partners come to share the same representations (i.e., linguistic [lexical, 
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syntactic, etc.] representations) as they interact. Such local alignment eventually leads to 
global alignment, that is, speakers come to share similar mental models of the situation under 
discussion. Local alignment relies on an automatic priming process which causes active 
linguistic representations to temporarily remain readily accessible in memory. Importantly, 
priming concerns both production and comprehension (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 
2000). It may occur because a speaker produces an utterance based on one or several given 
representation(s), but also because he or she hears his or her partner producing an utterance 
based on the same representation(s). In the current study, producing a reference (i.e., 
presenting a reference, accepting a reference through verbatim repetition or reusing a 
reference) and/or understanding a reference (i.e., hearing one’s partner presenting a reference, 
hearing one’s partner accepting a reference through verbatim repetition or hearing one’s 
partner reusing a reference) made the participants more likely to subsequently reuse and/or to 
recall this reference. Therefore, the results reported here might also reflect between- and 
within-partner priming in dialogue. The fact that such priming was observed in both 
experiments would suggest that lexical alignment occurs both in face-to-face and mediated 
dialogue. What’s more, as highlighted above, one of the functions of local alignment (e.g., 
lexical alignment) is to contribute to global alignment (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). Such 
function might be all the more important in mediated dialogue settings where the partners do 
not have access to visual copresence, as it is presumably more difficult for the partners to 
build similar representations of the situation under discussion in such settings. In particular, 
the fact that there was not significant effect of Partner Role on recall in Experiment 2 would 
imply that at the end of the experiment, both participants held a similar representation of the 
route discussed, thus suggesting that the strength of the priming mechanisms at play during 
the interaction was sufficient to increase mental model similarity regardless of the role 
initially played during the interaction.  
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 In conclusion, these two experiments shed light on the interconnections between 
ordinary memory processes and common ground use in dialogue. Indeed, the results are in 
line with the idea that accounting for speaker behavior during dialogue requires to study 
dialogue as a collaborative activity during which speakers jointly gather common ground 
(Clark, 1996). However, the fact that individual speakers are sensitive to ordinary processes 
which might affect dialogue management must also be taken into account (e.g., Horton & 
Gerrig, 2005a; Pickering & Garrod, 2004), if only to explain how reference production at the 
time of presentation and acceptance affects subsequent reference accessibility in memory. 
Experimenting outside of the laboratory contributes to enhancing the validity of the findings 
obtained within this framework.   
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Table 1 
Annotated Dialogue and Route Samples 
Part. Utterance content (English translation) Comments Coding 
B towards the end of the literature building to 
arrive in front of the psychology building 
The references “the literature building” and 
“the psychology building” are produced for 
the first time in the dyad. 
 
The references “the literature building” and 
“the psychology building” are coded as self-
presented from B’s point of view and as 
partner-presented from A’s point of view. 
A the psychology building The reference “the psychology building” is 
repeated verbatim by the other participant 
(A) before its initiator (B) produces another 
reference. 
The reference “the psychology building” is 
coded as accepted through verbatim 
repetition. 
B Yeah   
A Well   
B so here the student house is in front of us to 
the left 
The reference “the student house” is 
produced for the first time in the dyad. 
B, who presented the reference “the 
literature building”, produces another 
reference before A has the opportunity to 
accept this reference through verbatim 
repetition or anaphorically. 
The reference “the student house” is coded 
as self-presented from B’s point of view and 
as partner-presented from A’s point of view. 
The reference “the literature building” is 
coded as accepted implicitly. 
A in front of us yes  A zero anaphor (“yes” in fact meaning “yes 
[the student house is in front of us]”) is used 
by the other participant (A) to re-refer to the 
student house before its initiator (B) 
produces another reference.  
The reference “the student house” is coded 
as accepted anaphorically. 
B yes in front of us the student house and to 
the left the psychology building 
The reference to the student house is not 
coded as reused, as this speech turn is not 
The reference “the psychology building” is 
coded by reused by B and as non-reused by 
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preceded by two speech turns in which this 
reference was not produced, contrary to the 
reference to the psychology building.  
A. It is also coded as reused once by the 
dyad. 
Part. Route content Coding 
A […] After that you should cross the street and to the left you will 
see the psychology building. Continue straight on, just in front of 
you you will find the student house. […] 
The references “the psychology building” and “the student house” 
are coded as recalled by Speaker A. 
B […] We cross the street and we continue straight on. We walk past 
of the psychology building and the laboratory. […] 
The reference “the psychology building” is coded as recalled by 
Speaker B. 
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Table 2 
Coding Example 
Reference Participant Presentation (IV#1) Acceptance (IV#2) Reuse (DV#1) Reuses in Dyad (IV#3) Recall (DV#2) 
Psychology building A Partner-presented Verbatim Non-reused 1 Recalled 
Psychology building B Self-presented Verbatim Reused 1 Recalled 
Student house A Partner-presented Anaphoric Non-reused 0 Recalled 
Student house B Self-presented Anaphoric Non-reused 0 Non-recalled 
Literature building A Partner-presented Implicit Non-reused 0 Non-recalled 
Literature building B Self-presented Implicit Non-reused 0 Non-recalled 
Pyramid-shaped building A Non-presented / / / / 
Pyramid-shaped building B Non-presented / / / / 
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Table 3 
Experiment 1 – Number (and Proportions) of References Reused and Non-Reused by the 
Participants as a Function of Presentation and of Acceptance 
 Self-presented Partner-presented 
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Reused 33 (.38) 31 (.36) 
Non-reused 54 (.62) 56 (.64) 
Total 
 
87 87 
Accepted anaphorically   
Reused 42 (.43) 26 (.27) 
Non-reused 56 (.57) 72 (.73) 
Total 
 
98 98 
Accepted implicitly   
Reused 36 (.32) 15 (.14) 
Non-reused 75 (.68) 96 (.86) 
Total 111 111 
Note. The total number of presented references being 296, the maximum number of reuses 
was 592 (296*2), as any presented reference could be reused by up to two participants. The 
proportions reported in parentheses were calculated by dividing the number of reused 
references (or the number of non-reused references) by the total number of references 
presented in each cell of the experimental design.  
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Table 4 
Experiment 1 – Number (and Proportions) of References Recalled and Non-Recalled by the 
Participants as a Function of Presentation and of Acceptance 
 Self-presented Partner-presented 
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Recalled 59 (.68) 53 (.61) 
Non-recalled 28 (.32) 34 (.39) 
Total 
 
87 87 
Accepted anaphorically   
Recalled 43 (.44) 41 (.42) 
Non-recalled 55 (.56) 57 (.58) 
Total 
 
98 98 
Accepted implicitly   
Recalled 48 (.43) 34 (.31) 
Non-recalled 63 (.57) 77 (.69) 
Total 111 111 
Note. The corresponding proportions are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Experiment 2 – Number (and Proportions) of References Reused and Non-Reused by the 
Participants as a Function of Presentation, Acceptance and Partner Role 
 Self-presented Partner-presented 
   
On-campus participant   
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Reused 21 (.68) 9 (.56) 
Non-reused 10 (.32) 7 (.44) 
Total 
 
31 16 
Accepted anaphorically   
Reused 66 (.55) 22 (.56) 
Non-reused 53 (.45) 17 (.44) 
Total 
 
119 39 
Accepted implicitly   
Reused 19 (.40) 5 (.71) 
Non-reused 29 (.60) 2 (.29) 
Total 
 
48 7 
   
Remote participant   
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Reused 9 (.56) 15 (.48) 
Non-reused 7 (.44) 16 (.52) 
Total 
 
16 31 
Accepted anaphorically   
Reused 16 (.41) 37 (.31) 
Non-reused 23 (.59) 82 (.68) 
Total 
 
39 119 
Accepted implicitly   
Reused 3 (.43) 8 (.17) 
Non-reused 4 (.57) 40 (.83) 
Total 7 48 
Note. The total number of presented references being 260, the maximum number of reuses 
was 520. The corresponding proportions are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Experiment 2 – Number (and Proportions) of References Recalled and Non-Recalled by the 
Participants as a Function of Presentation, Acceptance and Partner Role 
 Self-presented Partner-presented 
   
On-campus participant   
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Recalled 21 (.68) 11 (.69) 
Non-recalled 10 (.32) 5 (.31) 
Total 
 
31 16 
Accepted anaphorically   
Recalled 69 (.58) 20 (.51) 
Non-recalled 50 (.42) 19 (.49) 
Total 
 
119 39 
Accepted implicitly   
Recalled 25 (.52) 4 (.57) 
Non-recalled 23 (.48) 3 (.43) 
Total 
 
48 7 
   
Remote participant   
Accepted through verbatim repetition   
Recalled 12 (.75) 20 (.65) 
Non-recalled 4 (.25) 11 (.35) 
Total 
 
16 31 
Accepted anaphorically   
Recalled 25 (.64) 74 (.62) 
Non-recalled 14 (.36) 45 (.38) 
Total 
 
39 119 
Accepted implicitly   
Recalled 5 (.71) 25 (.52) 
Non-recalled 2 (.29) 23 (.48) 
Total 7 48 
Note. The corresponding proportions are reported in parentheses. 
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Appendix A: Specifying the random structure of the models used to analyze the data 
 
Logistic mixed models were used to analyze the data in the two experiments reported in this 
study. Logistic models are used in analyses where the outcome variable is binary (see Jaeger, 
2008). As for mixed models, they include both fixed effects (i.e., the IVs) and random effects. 
Random effects have two main functions in such models. First, there is potentially a strong 
dependency between the behaviors of two participants belonging to the same dyad (see 
McMahon et al., 2006). For instance, A’s tendency to reuse references more or less often 
might influence B’s tendency to reuse references more or less often, and vice-versa. In this 
context, mixed models are used to model the multilevel structure of the data (e.g., the fact that 
participants were nested within dyads in this study). Second, mixed models are used to 
account for potential variability between analysis units. Precisely, random intercepts allow 
accounting for variability across analysis units (in this case, dyads and participants) and 
random slopes allow accounting for analysis units differing in their sensitivity to the within-
unit fixed effects. For instance, in this study, some dyads might have tended to reuse more 
references than others, which was accounted for by including by-dyad random intercepts in 
the models; in a similar way, some dyads might have been more sensitive to the acceptance 
effect than others, which was accounted for by including by-dyad random slopes 
corresponding to the Acceptance IV in the models. Note that the same rationale can be 
applied at the participant level; when the study includes items (which was not the case here), 
the rationale can also be applied at the item level. 
 Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) have suggested that mixed models should 
initially include the maximal random effects structure justified by the experimental design. In 
other words, they should include all random intercepts and all random slopes corresponding to 
within-unit IVs. However, doing so might cause the models to fail to converge (i.e., to find an 
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appropriate way of modelling the data within the specified number of iterations). There are 
different kinds of convergence problems, one of which can easily be solved using the 
GLIMMIX procedure in SAS (Kiernan, Tao, & Gibbs, 2012). This problem concerns the 
variance-covariance matrix for the random effects, or G matrix. G matrix convergence issues 
occur when the variance of at least one of the random effects included in the model is equal to 
zero, controlling for everything else in the model. For instance, in the current study, dyads 
might not have significantly differed in their sensitivity to Acceptance: in this case, the 
variance associated with by-dyad random slopes corresponding to Acceptance would be zero, 
and the model including this random effect would fail to converge. The random effects 
causing such convergence problems can be removed from the model without affecting the 
output of the analysis (slight variations in F values and model parameters might be observed); 
they can also be left in the model, because, as pointed out by Kiernan et al. (2012), “there is 
nothing inherently wrong with the results when this [convergence problem] occurs” (p. 10). 
SAS 9.4 allows directly identifying which random effects cause the G matrix convergence 
problem and removing these from the model without having to perform a step-by-step model 
comparison analysis. These random effects can then be removed from the model without 
affecting the output of the analysis.  
 In this study, each analysis was initially conducted using a model including by-dyad 
and by-participant random intercepts, as well as all by-dyad and by-participant random slopes 
corresponding to within-participant IVs (in other words, each analysis was initially conducted 
using the maximal random effect structure justified by the design; Barr et al., 2013). 
However, this structure systematically led to G matrix convergence problems, as at least one 
of the random effects was associated with a variance of zero. These effects were identified 
and removed from the model for the final analysis. Only the results from the final analyses are 
reported in Appendix B: indeed, reporting the results from the initial analysis would have 
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been redundant, for in each analysis, the model parameters corresponding to the initial model 
and final model were identical (Kiernan et al., 2012). For information purposes, the SAS 
syntax used to run both the initial and final analyses is provided in the online supplementary 
material.   
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Appendix B: Test of Fixed Effects, Model Parameters and Covariance Parameter 
Estimates Corresponding to the Final Analyses Conducted 
 
Table B1 
Experiment 1 – Reuse Analysis – Test of Fixed Effects, Model Parameters and Covariance 
Parameter Estimates Corresponding to the Final Model 
Test of fixed effects 
Effect Num DF Den DF F value p value 
Presentation 1 49 6.06 .017 
Acceptance 2 588 5.29 .005 
 
Model parameters      
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t value p value 
Intercept -1.57 0.22 146 -7.02 < .001 
Presentation: Self 0.58 0.24 49 2.46 .017 
Presentation: Partner 0     
Acceptance: Verbatim 0.70 0.24 588 2.98 .003 
Acceptance: Anaphoric 0.61 0.23 588 2.66 .008 
Acceptance: Implicit 0     
Note. Estimate values set to 0 correspond to the baselines used in the analysis. 
 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Subject Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Dyad Intercept / / 
Dyad Presentation / / 
Dyad Acceptance / / 
Participant Intercept / / 
Participant Presentation 0.26 0.14 
Participant Acceptance / / 
Note. Estimate values noted / correspond to the random effects which were associated with a 
variance equal to zero in the initial analysis and which were therefore removed in the final 
analysis. 
 
Table B2 
Experiment 1 – Recall Analysis – Test of Fixed Effects, Model Parameters and Covariance 
Parameter Estimates Corresponding to the Final Model 
Test of fixed effects 
Effect Num DF Den DF F value p value 
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Presentation 1 587 4.37 .037 
Acceptance 2 587 10.56 < .001 
Number of Reuses 1 12 54.63 < .001 
 
Model parameters      
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t value p value 
Intercept -0.50 0.24 45 -2.10 .041 
Presentation: Self 0.40 0.19 587 2.09 .037 
Presentation: Partner 0     
Acceptance: Verbatim 1.06 0.24 587 4.39 < .001 
Acceptance: Anaphoric 0.20 0.24 587 0.84 .400 
Acceptance: Implicit 0     
Number of Reuses 1.39 0.19 12 7.39 < .001 
Note. Estimate values set to 0 correspond to the baselines used in the analysis. 
 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Subject Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Dyad Intercept 0.25 0.15 
Dyad Presentation / / 
Dyad Acceptance / / 
Dyad Reuses 0.14 0.17 
Participant Intercept / / 
Participant Presentation / / 
Participant Acceptance / / 
Participant Reuses / / 
Note. Estimate values noted / correspond to the random effects which were associated with a 
variance equal to zero in the initial analysis and which were therefore removed in the final 
analysis. 
 
Table B3 
Experiment 2 – Reuse Analysis – Test of Fixed Effects, Model Parameters and Covariance 
Parameter Estimates Corresponding to the Final Model 
Test of fixed effects 
Effect Num DF Den DF F value p value 
Partner Role 1 14.75 5.85 .029 
Presentation 1 24.09 0.07 .790 
Acceptance 2 11.60 3.99 .048 
 
Model parameters      
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t value p value 
Intercept -1.28 0.36 52 -3.58 < .001 
Presentation: Self 0.07 0.26 24 0.27 .790 
Presentation: Partner 0     
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Acceptance: Verbatim 0.91 0.33 18 2.78 .012 
Acceptance: Anaphoric 0.55 0.27 12 2.05 .063 
Acceptance: Implicit 0     
Partner role: On-campus 0.89 0.37 15 2.42 .029 
Partner role: Remote      
Note. Estimate values set to 0 correspond to the baselines used in the analysis. 
 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Subject Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Dyad Intercept 0.18 0.34 
Dyad Presentation / / 
Dyad Acceptance 0.01 0.27 
Dyad Location 0.38 / 
Participant Intercept 0.08 / 
Participant Presentation 0.14 0.22 
Participant Acceptance / 0.36 
Participant Location 0.02 0.41 
Note. Estimate values noted / correspond to the random effects which were associated with a 
variance equal to zero in the initial analysis and which were therefore removed in the final 
analysis. 
 
Table B4 
Experiment 2 – Recall Analysis – Test of Fixed Effects, Model Parameters and Covariance 
Parameter Estimates Corresponding to the Final Model 
Test of fixed effects 
Effect Num DF Den DF F value p value 
Presentation 1 512 0.93 .335 
Acceptance 2 32 0.68 .516 
Location 1 269 2.01 .157 
Number of Reuses 1 32 30.08 < .001 
Number of Reuses * Acceptance 2 367 4.76 .009 
 
Model parameters      
Effect Estimate Standard Error DF t value p value 
Intercept 1.29 0.60 86 2.14 .035 
Presentation: Self 0.24 0.25 512 0.97 .335 
Presentation: Partner 0     
Acceptance: Verbatim -0.11 0.61 62 -0.18 .858 
Acceptance: Anaphoric -0.50 0.57 66 -0.87 .386 
Acceptance: Implicit 0     
Number of reuses 3.01 0.83 412 3.64 < .001 
Partner role: On-campus -0.37 0.26 269 -1.42 .157 
Partner role: Remote 0     
Number of reuses * Acceptance: -2.20 0.89 505 -2.47 .014 
Naturalistic reference generation 
42 
Verbatim 
Number of reuses * Acceptance: 
Anaphoric 
-1.11 0.85 440 -1.31 .191 
Number of reuses * Acceptance: 
Implicit 
0     
Note. Estimate values set to 0 correspond to the baselines used in the analysis. 
 
Covariance parameter estimates 
Subject Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Dyad Intercept 1.04 0.62 
Dyad Location / / 
Dyad Presentation / / 
Dyad Acceptance 0.37 0.28 
Dyad Number of Reuses 0.12 0.42 
Dyad Number of Reuses * Acceptance / / 
Participant Intercept / / 
Participant Location / / 
Participant Presentation / / 
Participant Acceptance / / 
Participant Number of Reuses 0.27 0.34 
Participant Number of Reuses * Acceptance / / 
Note. Estimate values noted / correspond to the random effects which were associated with a 
variance equal to zero in the initial analysis and which were therefore removed in the final 
analysis. 
 
